

Round-optimal and Abuse-Free Optimistic Multi-party Contract Signing

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
Outline

1. **Introduction**
2. **Round-optimal optimistic
multi-party contract signing**
3. **Abuse freeness**
4. **Summary**

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1.1 Scenario for contract signing



1.2 Model

Participants

- Signatories P_1, \dots, P_n $\text{sign}_i(m)$
- Verifiers V_1, \dots, V_n
- Trusted third party T $\text{sign}_T(m)$
- Can non-deterministically decide to stop waiting for events

Adversary model

- Up to t of the n signatories are maliciously dishonest
- Signatures are unforgeable

Network


- Asynchronous, scheduled by adversary
- Eventual delivery, but in arbitrary order

1.3 Security requirements

- **Correctness**
 - all P_i are honest, ‘patient’ and sign \Rightarrow all decide “signed”
- **Unforgeability & no surprises with invalid contracts**
 - P_i never signed, or decided “failed” $\Rightarrow V_j$ never decides “signed”
- **Verifiability**
 - P_i decided “signed,” V_j is ‘patient’ $\Rightarrow V_j$ decides “signed”
- **Termination**
- **Abuse freeness**
 - Adversary cannot prove to an outside party that he has the power to control the contract [Garay, Jakobsson, MacKenzie 1999]

1.4 State of the art

Naive protocol with inline third party:



1.4 State of the art

Avoid T as trust bottleneck

- Gradual exchange of privilege, i.e., exchange fragments of contract, in many rounds
- Limitation: error at least linear in number of rounds
[Ben Or, Goldreich, Micali, Rivest 1990]

Minimize involvement of T

- **Optimistic contract signing**, i.e., involve third party only if something goes wrong
[Micali 1997; Asokan, Schunter, Waidner 1997]

1.4 State of the art

	Synchronous optimistic	Asynchronous optimistic	Async. opt. + abuse free
$n = 2$	Micali 1997, Asokan, Schunter, Waidner 1997	Asokan, Shoup, Waidner 1998	Garay, Jakobsson, MacKenzie 1999
any n	Asokan, Schunter, Waidner 1999	Baum-Waidner, Waidner 1998	Garay, MacKenzie 1999


Our contributions:

- Optimally efficient protocol for asynchronous, abuse-free contract signing: factor n over state of the art
- Provably secure construction for abuse freeness, using standard cryptographic operations only


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2.1 Protocol outline



2.2 When to switch from “abort” to “signed”?




Case 1

Case 2

General case

2.3 Reduce messages



2.4 Complexity

Worst case

- Round 0: Exchange = 2 rounds with $O(n)$ messages
- Rounds 1, ..., $t+2$: Exchange = 2 rounds w/ $O(n)$ msg
- Each party might contact T : +2 rounds with $O(n)$ msg

Total


- $2t+8$ rounds
(or $t+5$ rounds)
- $O(tn)$ messages
(or $O(tn^2)$ messages)
- $O(tn^2 \log n)$ bit

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3.1 Abuse freeness

Basic protocol allows “abuse.”



3.2 Abuse-free protocol

Distribute fresh keys pk_i + encrypted “certificates” $ecert_i$:


$cert_i := \text{SIGN}_i(i, pk_i, tid, contr)$ (kept secret!)
 $ecert_i := E_T(r_i, cert_i)$

Use fresh keys to sign “pre-contract”
 $(tid, contr, pk_1, \dots, pk_n, ecert_1, \dots, ecert_n)$

If pre-contract is signed then open all $ecert_i$
(if necessary with T 's help)

signed contract = signed pre-contract +
 $(r_1, cert_1, \dots, r_n, cert_n)$ or $\text{sign}_T(cert_1, \dots, cert_n)$

3.2 Abuse-free protocol



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4 Summary

Result

- Optimistic multi-party contract signing protocol
- Factor of n more efficient than previous solution, and provably optimal for $t = n-1$
- Simple solution for abuse-freeness

Outlook

- Optimally efficient protocols for general t
- Reductions of other fair exchange problems to contract signing